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I. INTRODUCTION
The Brazilian way of coping with the formal legal system is typi-
fied in this story of a recent graduate of a European medical school
who wished to immigrate .to Brazil. At his visa appointment, the Bra-
zilian counsel in Paris immediately changed the applicant's profes-
sion from doctor to agronomist, explaining: "In that way I can issue
you a visa immediately. You know how these things are? Professional
quotas, confidential instructions from the department of immigra-
tion. Utter nonsense! .... In any event, this way will make it per-
fectly legal."1
At first the European protested, thinking the consul was trying to
trap him into making a false declaration. The consul, however, in-
sisted that reclassifying the European doctor as an agronomist would
solve rather than create problems. The consul explained that he was
simply employing the jeito, a Brazilian word that has no precise
translation but corresponds roughly to a knack, twist, way, or fix.
Only after living in Brazil for some time did this "medical-agrono-
mist" realize that he had immigrated to a country where laws and
regulations are enacted upon the assumption that a substantial per-
centage will be disobeyed, and where "civil servants, be they small or
powerful, create their own law. Although this law does not happen to
correspond with the original law, it meets with general approbation,
provided that it is dictated by common sense."2
That Brazilian laws and regulations are regularly twisted to the
demands of expediency does not make Brazil unique. The bending of
legal norms to expediency occurs to some extent in all countries.3 It is
especially common in Latin America, where the gap between the law
on the books and actual practice is notoriously large.' What is strik-
ing about Brazil is that the practice of bending legal rules to expedi-
1. P. KELLEMEN, BRASm PARA PRINCIPIANTES (8th ed. 1964).
2. Id. at 11-12.
3. Certain aspects of the jeito are well known in the United States, as any lawyer who has
handled an uncontested divorce, invented the minutes of fictitious meetings of shareholders in
small corporations, or engaged in plea bargaining in criminal cases will attest.
4. Edir, Law in Latin America, in 1 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 39, 42-43 (N.Y.U. ed.




ency has been elevated into a highly prized paralegal institution
called the jeito. The jeito has become an integral part of Brazil's le-
gal culture. In many areas of the law, the jeito is the norm and the
formal legal rule is the exception.
Jeito is easier to describe than to define. A visiting French social
scientist, unable to find any equivalent in French, defined the jeito as
"an ingenious maneuver that renders the impossible, possible; the
unjust, just; and the illegal, legal."' 5 A Brazilian sociologist has de-
fined the jeito as "a genuinely Brazilian process for resolving difficul-
ties despite the content of rules, codes, and laws."6
The difficulty with these definitions is that the Brazilians use the
term jeito, and its diminuitive jeitinho, to refer to several distinct
modes of behavior that have very different implications for societal
functioning. Regardless of whether the Brazilian consul classified the
European doctor as an agronomist because of sympathy, a bribe, or a
sincere belief that the country needed more skilled physicians,
Brazilians would refer to the consul's bending of the law as a jeito.
For analytic purposes the jeito can be broken down into at least
five different kinds of behavior:
(1) A government official fails to perform a legal duty because of
private pecuniary or status gains; i.e., the official awards a govern-
ment contract to the highest briber.
(2) A private citizen employs a subterfuge to circumvent a legal
obligation that is sensible and just (in an objective sense); i.e., an
exporter under-invoices a shipment, receiving part of the purchase
price abroad in foreign currency in order to evade currency controls
and taxes on part of his profits.
(3) A public servant performs his legal duty speedily only in ex-
change for private pecuniary or status gains; i.e., an official refuses to
process an application to renew an auto license unless he has received
a tip or knows the applicant.
(4) A private citizen circumvents a legal obligation that is unreal-
istic, unjust, or economically inefficient; i.e., loans are disguised as
joint ventures or borrowers are required to maintain compensating
balances at low interest in order to circumvent a usury law that lim-
its lawful interest to a rate well below market rates.
(5) A public servant deviates from his legal duty because of his
conviction that the law is unrealistic, unjust, or economically ineffi-
cient; i.e., a labor inspector overlooks the failure of a marginal firm in
an area of high unemployment to pay the official minimum wage on
the theory that strict enforcement would be likely to throw many em-
5. C. MoRn, LEs TRois ALGES DU BiiSl. 195 (1954).
6. A. Gumutmo RAMos, ADMINISTRACO E EsT'RATGIA DO DES NVOLVIMENTO 380 (1966).
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ployees out of work and perhaps shut down the plant altogether.
The first two kinds of behavior fit the conventional definition of
corruption-dishonest behavior benefiting an individual at the ex-
pense of the state. The third kind of behavior can also be labelled
corruption by conventional standards, although most people would
consider it less morally offensive than the first two forms of corrup-
tion. The fourth and fifth kinds of behavior are those in which public
purposes are arguably served by evading legal obligations. These
components of the jeito bear no stigma. On the contrary, they have
made the jeito a highly prized Brazilian institution.
Obviously, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Some civil
servants become aware of a law's uneconomic or unjust aspects only
after their palms have been greased. Public officials sometimes coop-
erate with private citizens in legitimizing or facilitating the vitiation
of legal rules by subterfuge.
7
Until recently, the jeito was not considered a topic worthy of seri-
ous scholarly inquiry. As with the related institution of corruption,
research on the jeito was considered taboo for lawyers and social
scientists. This is partly attributable to the bias of Brazilian law
schools against empirical research and in favor of classical exegesis of
legal texts. Perhaps even more important is the difficulty in carrying
out such research. Since the jeito often involves illegal transactions,
participants tend to be less than candid in describing what has tran-
spired. The written record, at least on its face, usually appears en-
tirely legal. In addition, there is the problem of what Gunnar Myrdal
has characterized as "diplomacy in research.""
The jeito is so entwined with problems of corruption that it is far
more politic, especially for the foreign researcher, to pretend that le-
gal rules correspond to what is done rather than run the risk of em-
barrassing friends and authorities by calling attention to the dispari-
ties. Yet, to understand the Brazilian legal system, one cannot afford
to neglect this critical aspect of the legal process. Attitudes toward
law reflected in a paralegal institution like the jeito are at least as
important, and in many ways, more important than the institutions
7. A clear example is the Brazilian experience with rent control. Residential rents re-
mained frozen during a 17 year period during which the cost of living rose at an annual average
of more than 22%. Rent control statutes prohibited the landlord from raising the rent or evict-
ing the tenant, but permitted the landlord to retake the premises for his own use or that of his
family. Many landlords simulated a personal need for the leasehold in order to secure an under-
the-table rent increase or to evict an undesired tenant. Recognizing the injustice created by the
statute, the courts facilitated this jeito by placing the burden of proving the insincerity of the
request upon the tenant, a priori an almost impossible task. Rosenn, Controlled Rents and
Uncontrolled Inflation: The Brazilian Dilemma, 17 Am. J. CoMP. L. 239 (1969).
8. 2 AsiN DRAMA 939 (1969).
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enshrined in the formal structure.
II. THE ROOTS OF THE JEITO
The roots of the jeito run deep into the Iberian past. During the
critical formative era, Portuguese attitudes toward law were funda-
mentally influenced by Roman law, legal pluralism, and Catholicism.
As a result of Portuguese colonization, these same fundamental influ-
ences shaped Brazilian attitudes toward law. Brazilian attitudes to-
ward the administration of law were also shaped by the peculiar
character of Portuguese colonial rule, as well as five cultural charac-
teristics bequeathed by the Portuguese: high tolerance for corruption,
lack of civic responsibility, profound socio-economic inequality, senti-
mentalism, and a willingness to compromise. The jeito is firmly
rooted in this Luso-Roman legacy.
A. The Dual Roman Law Heritage
Iberian legal culture has been heavily influenced by Roman law.
Roman law was originally steeped in custom and experience; conse-
quently, it displayed remarkable flexibility and adaptability. It was a
vital legal order that grew and developed as Rome herself grew and
developed into the center of a vast empire.' By the late Empire, how-
ever, Roman law had begun to diverge from socio-economic reality
and to take on an idealistic and rigid character. Much that Justinian
preserved in the Corpus Juris had little relevance to the Rome of his
time. The Roman law revival that began in the eleventh century in
the West was based upon a slavish study of the text of the Corpus
Juris, and emphasized abstract, formal rules rather than socio-eco-
nomic context.
Portugal was one of the countries most profoundly influenced by
the scholasticism of the Glossators and the Commentators. Even
though Portuguese positive law specifically provided that the glosses
of Accursius and the opinions of Bartolus were to be applied only to
fill lacunae, the influence of Roman law was so great that Portuguese
judges frequently applied the solutions of these scholars in deroga-
tion of Portuguese statutory and customary law.10
The Roman law scholarship of the Glossators and the Commenta-
tors was primarily concerned with constructing a harmonious, univer-
sal system of ethical guides to conduct. This was largely accom-
plished by reasoning deductively from abstract moral postulates
culled from the Corpus Juris. The end product was displacement of
9. Thomas, Roman Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEMS 1-2 (J. Derrett ed. 1968).
10. 1 C. TRIPOLI, HIST6RIA DO DiRmTO BRAsuntmo 154 (1936).
1984]
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traditional or customary rules of law by unrealistic ethical standards
of conduct that reflected goals to be attained.
Portugal has a dual Roman law heritage. It inherited the living
Roman law from the six centuries of Roman occupation, in time
modified by custom and Gothic superimpositions. This aspect of Ro-
man law found its expression in the old Fuero Juzgo (the Visigothic
Code) and the Fuero Real (the Royal Code). It also inherited the ide-
alized Roman law, culled by academicians from the texts of Justin-
ian's Corpus Juris. It was this second aspect of Roman law that Por-
tuguese kings found highly useful in their struggle to unify diverse
legal systems and to expand their sovereign powers. This pattern of
dualism-law as an ideal versus law as a practical system for ordering
affairs-persists in Brazil today.
B. Legal Pluralism
The Romans also bequeathed Iberia a tradition of profound jurid-
ical inequality. Roman law recognized the principle of the personality
of laws, which meant that the law applicable to a particular person
depended upon the group to which he belonged rather than the terri-
tory in which he happened to live. Roman law was reserved for Ro-
man citizens, while the Iberians were governed by their own custom-
ary law, at least with respect to matters involving private law.1 The
Visigoths, who overran the Iberian Peninsula in the fifth century,
also applied the principle of the personality of laws. For much of
their reign, the Visigoths were governed by the Code of Euric, while
the Hispano-Romans were governed by the Breviary of Alaric (a
crude restatement of Roman law), as modified by Celto-Iberian cus-
tom.12 The Moors, who invaded the Peninsula early in the eighth
century, followed the same principle, applying Islamic law to their
own population and the Visigothic Code to the Roman-Gothic
population.1
3
The critical first century of Portugal's independence began in
1143 during the Reconquest, a state of more or less permanent war
that continued until 1249, when the Moors were finally expelled from
Portugal. The tradition of legal pluralism continued during the
Reconquest. The Portuguese kings customarily granted special legal
privileges, embodied in municipal charters called forais, to cities and
11. K. RYAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CIvnL LAW 6 (1962). In 212 A.D., Roman citizen-
ship, hitherto reserved for a few, was extended to all inhabitants of the Roman Empire. M.
CAETANO, HIST6RIA DO DiRniTo PORTUGUtS 64 (1981).
12. K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOP ENT IN LATIN AMERICA 21 (1975). This
dual legal system was eventually abrogated in the reign of Chindasvinth (641-652). Id.
13. Id. at 22.
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towns as they were freed from Moorish control. The forais, which
were contractual in nature, contained detailed rules and privileges for
self-governance of the locale. In addition, Portuguese kings granted
special legal privileges to the multiplicity of corporate estates that
made up medieval society. The nobility, military orders, clergy, uni-
versity faculty and students, merchants, and various other guilds
were generally exempted from the ordinary jurisdiction of the king's
courts and governed by their own forais, which created special laws
and courts."'
Thus, even before its birth as a nation, Portugal was characterized
by profound juridical inequality. During the Reconquest and for
many centuries thereafter, Portugal had the antithesis of a universal-
ist legal system. The de facto legal pluralism that is so often found in
Brazil is firmly rooted in the de jure legal pluralism of Portugal's
past.
C. The Influence of Catholicism
Historically, law and religion have blended in the heavily Catho-
lic, Iberian Peninsula. The result has usually been disrespect for law.
Catholicism, with its rigid dogmas, moral intolerance, formalism, and
slowness to change, has stimulated considerable jeito-like activity.
The tradition of disregard for law can be traced back at least as far
as the Fuero Juzgo, which contained outrageously intolerant pre-
scriptions prohibiting the Jews from practicing their religion. Despite
the harsh prohibitions of the Fuero Juzgo, however, Jews were able
to observe their religious customs by paying bribes. 15 Similarly, the
numerous Church-inspired laws for the protection of the Indians in
the Portuguese and Spanish colonies were widely disregarded by col-
onists bent on enslaving the Indian population."6
This pattern of paying lipservice to religiously inspired legislation
has continued in modern Brazil. Shortly after independence, Brazil
adopted a decree requiring that all questions of marriage be resolved
in accordance with canon law as prescribed in the Council of Trent
and the Constitution of the Archbishop of Bahia.1 7 Not until 1977
did Brazil permit divorce under any circumstances. Even then, enact-
ment of a divorce law required a constitutional amendment. 18
14. M. CAETANO, supra note 11, at 235-39.
15. S. SCOTT, THE VISIGOTHIC CODE Xiii (1910).
16. See S. SCHWARTZ, SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIETY IN COLONIAL BRAZIL 122-39 (1973). Resis-
tance to Hapsburg Indian policy was so strong among Brazilian colonists that the Crown was
eventually forced to repeal this legislation because it could not be enforced. Id. at 137.
17. Decree of Nov. 3, 1827.
18. Law No. 6.515 of Dec. 26, 1977, made possible by Constitutional Amendment No. 9 of
June 28. 1977.
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Brazilians coped with canon law's absolute prohibition against di-
vorce by treating legal separation as a divorce, and by often con-
tracting subsequent marriages outside Brazil or in foreign embassies.
Despite their illegality, these marriages enjoyed considerable social
acceptance, particularly in urban areas. 19 Moreover, Brazilian legisla-
tion steadily expanded the legal rights of "second wives," permitting
the second wife to receive accidental death benefits and governmen-
tal pensions under certain circumstances to the detriment of the legal
wife, and according the children of second unions full legitimate
status.2 °
Another religiously inspired legal measure is the usury law, which
prohibits charging interest greater than twelve percent per annum.21
This statute has been so circumvented by a wide variety of jeitos in
the wake of double and triple digit inflation that it is today widely
regarded as revoked by practice.22 Similarly, abortion is a crime, but
an estimated three million abortions are performed each year, giving
Brazil one of the highest abortion rates in the world.23
D. Colonial Administration
The manner in which Portugal administered its colony indelibly
stamped the legal institutions of Brazil. The diversity of means for
transmitting the royal will to the colonists was nearly matched by the
diversity of means for colonial administrators to frustrate that will.
The result was bureaucratic confusion, administrative delay, mistrust
of government officials, and disrespect for law. This colonial heritage
has impeded a series of attempts at administrative reform in Brazil.
1. The Legacy of Patrimonialism
Portuguese colonial rule, like that of the Spanish, was essentially
patrimonialist.24 It was the product of an absolute monarchy, with
19. See T. DE AZEVEDO, SOCIAL CHANGE IN BRAZIL 26-31 (1963); El Divorcio en America
Latina, 37 Visin 50 (Nov. 21, 1969).
20. See W. BARROS MONTEIRO, CURSO DE DIRErro CiviL, DiREIrro DA FAMILIA 15-22 (8th ed.
1968).
21. Decree No. 22.626 of Apr. 7, 1933. Law No. 1.521 of Dec. 26, 1951, art. 4, provides
criminal penalties for usury.
22. J. CHACEL, M. SIMONSEN, & A. WALD, CORREQXO MONETXRIA 19 (1970). For some of the
jeitos employed in Brazil to circumvent the usury law, see K. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 186-
87, 201-02 (1982); Simonsen, Brazilian Inflation: Postwar Experience and Outcome of the 1964
Reforms, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES: LATIN AMERICA 261, 301-04 (Comm. for Econ. Dev.
Supp. Paper No. 21, 1967).
23. Jornal do Brasil, Nov. 6, 1983, 1st cad., at 15. See also W. RODRIGUES, LAW AND POPU-
LATION IN BRAZIL 18-19 (1975).
24. R. FAORO, Os DONOS DO PODER: FORMAQLO DO PATRONATO POLITICO BRASILEIRO 15-22,
130-31 (3d ed. 1976); F. URICOECHEA, THE PATRIMONIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRAZILAN BUREAU-
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"the King as its head, chief, father, representation of God on earth
supreme dispenser of all favors, and rightful regulator of all activi-
ties, even to all personal and individual expressions of his subjects
and vassals. '25 Administrators were tied to the king by bonds of per-
sonal loyalty and profit rather than official duty. All taxes, tributes,
and the royal share in monopoly profits were the personal income of
the sovereign rather than the nation. Patrimonialism produced wide-
spread corruption, an incredible penchant for bureaucratic red tape,
and a highly unpredictable and personalistic legal system.
a. Corruption
A patrimonialist regime generates a relatively low expectation
that government officials will act honestly and in the public interest.
This is because the concepts of public service and public office are
alien to patrimonialism. Instead, an administrative position or office
is regarded as a personal privilege granted or purchased from the
king.2 It is not surprising that even by the relaxed standards of the
colonial era, the Portuguese enjoyed "an unenviable reputation for
corruption. ' 27 Because patrimonalism encouraged colonial adminis-
trators to view their office as a franchise for private gain, Brazilian
history abounds with tales of corruption and dishonesty on the part
of Portuguese officials.2 8 Citizens could claim no rights in a patrimo-
nial regime. Instead of public services, citizens sought favors from the
government. These were dispensed on a personal basis, often in re-
CRATIC STATE (1980); E. WILLEMS, LATIN AMERICAN CULTURE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS
89-98 (1975). Patrimonialism is an archetypical form of political system in which a traditional
sovereign, such as a king, either personally or through his administrative staff, determines all
political and administrative decisions. The sovereign, however, gives up some of this absolute
power by ceding to certain officials or private individuals special rights or privileges, in ex-
change for goods or services, thereby creating estates. In this form of organization, the "legal
order is rigorously formal but thoroughly concrete and in this sense irrational. Only an 'empiri-
cal' type of legal interpretation can develop. All 'administration' is negotiation, bargaining, and
contracting about 'privileges,' the content of which must then be fixed." M. WEBER, ON LAW IN
ECONOMY AND SOCIETv 263 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1967). See also 3 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCI-
ETY 1010-42 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
25. C. PRADO JUNIOR, FORMAQXO DO BRASH CONTEMPORANEO 297 (1942).
26. E. WLLEMs, supra note 24, at 90.
27. Tyrawly to Newcastle in Public Record Office London, State Papers/Portugal 89/40,
cited in D. ALDEN, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN COLONIAL BRAZIL 209 (1968). In a dispatch from
Lisbon dated Feb. 14, 1738, Lord Tyrawly reported:
The Portuguese, more than any other people adhere to that rule of Scripture, that a gift
maketh room for a man, and it is incredible how a present smooths the difficulties of a
solicitation; nay, they even expect it, and though the presents necessary are not consider-
able, since a few dozen bottles of foreign wine, or a few yards of fine cloth will suffice, yet
this often repeated amounts of money.
Id.
28. See D. ALDEN, supra note 27, at 389; R. FAORO, supra note 24, at 172-75.
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turn for graft.29 One has only to recall the successful campaign slogan
circulated about Adhemar de Barros when running for the governor-
ship of S~o Paulo-"Rouba mas faz!" ("He steals but gets something
done!")-to realize the persistency of this negative expectancy of
public morality.
b. Bureaucratic Red Tape
Patrimonialism produced a superabundance of red tape, for the
sovereign delegated no real decision-making powers to his colonial
administrators. Their function was simply to execute royal com-
mands. Seemingly interminable delays and endless red tape were
produced by the exaggerated centralization of bureaucratic power in
Lisbon. The extraordinary preoccupation with trivia by the Overseas
Council (Conselho Ultramarino), the Lisbon-based administrative
organ that superintended the Portuguese colonies from 1642 to 1808,
was astonishing. The Council directly concerned itself with even the
pettiest details of Brazilian life, such as the quality of wood used for
crating sugar and sex life of slaves. As one of the most astute stu-
dents of Brazilian colonial life put it:
Lisbon wanted to know about everything, and the Council was
interested in everything, at least theoretically, for in practice
the physical impossibility of attending to such an accumula-
tion of paper work not only delayed dispatches, sometimes for
decades, but also left a great number of cases to repose eter-
nally in the drawers of the archives.30
c. The Ad Hoc Administration of Justice
Patrimonialism produced a judicial system in Brazil that was es-
sentially inefficient and venal. Lack of justice was a constant com-
plaint, even though apparently well qualified magistrates were dis-
patched from Portugal to man the benches. Justice was regularly
bartered like any other commodity, albeit delivered more slowly. Ju-
dicially collecting a debt was an extremely onerous, time-consuming,
and expensive proposition, subject to many exceptions and much
paperwork. The decisions of the magistrates were never really final,
for everyone had the right to appeal any decision directly to the king,
who dispensed justice as he saw fit that day. Supervision over the
notaries and judicial clerks was practically nil. Since these offices
were frequently leased or subleased, sometimes for more than the po-
29. E. WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 90.




sition's salary, the investment in the office was commonly recouped
through acceptance of bribes. That most colonists preferred the jus-
tice of their own (or hired) hands, family or friends to that of the
King's magistrates was hardly suprising.
Not even the laws regulating the conduct and qualifications of the
magistrates themselves were observed. Although expressly forbidden
by law to marry Brazilians, the Portuguese magistrates did so regu-
larly. They also became involved with Brazilian colonists in business
ventures that made some of the magistrates quite wealthy. Although
the laws prohibited Brazilians from serving on the high courts and in
other judicial capacities, in practice these statutes were continually
bent to permit Brazilians to hold these posts.31
Much of the law that governed colonial Brazil was personalized
and ad hoc. Laws and decrees were often tailored for a particular
individual or situation and had no more universal application. Scan-
ning the confused and contradictory mass of statutes, orders, opin-
ions, regulations, alvaras, decrees, cartas-de-lei, edicts, and instruc-
tions, through which the sovereign transmitted his will to the
Brazilian colony, one is amazed that the administrative machinery
functioned at all.
3 2
These transmissions from Portugal supplemented the basic law,
31. S. SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 325-27.
32. Perhaps the best summary of the nature of Portuguese colonial rule is this description
of two Belgian scholars:
The institutions in the Portuguese colonies were mostly copied from those of the metrop-
olis, without being, however, adapted to their new destination. Administrative organiza-
tion never proceeded according to a uniform plan: it was determined by the march of
events. The duties of many officials, their hierarchy and relations of service, were not
stipulated by laws or general rules, but by a mass of special decrees, some appointing
functionaries for the places, others dealing with the solution of a transitory difficulty or
the suppression of some abuse. Often the administrative machinery worked of itself, as a
result of habit or routine, sometimes in accordance with the designs of the central gov-
ernment, other times against them.
If the Portuguese kings since the reign of John 11 (1481-95) had their lawyers who
gave the laws of the kingdom the interpretation most suitable to the interest of the
Crown, the colonial governors also had their own legal authorities, who furnished the
texts with the meaning most favorable to the power of the chiefs who respectively em-
ployed them. It is certainly not an easy task to describe this administrative machinery,
even when one knows the text of the laws and decrees which have organized it, which is
not always the case; but it is still more difficult to explain their real working. It is fre-
quently impossible to distinguish with certainty the laws that were applied from those
which were not applied, or which were not applied as they ought to have been, and it is
not without difficulty that we are enabled to define with precision the duties of the sev-
eral authorities.
C. LANNOY & H. VANDERLINDEN, HISTOIRE DE L'EXPANSION COLONIALE DES PEUPLES EUROPtENS
87-88 (1907), cited in M. OLIvEIRA LIMA, THE EVOLUTION OF BRAZIL COMPARED WITH THAT OF
SPANISH AND ANGLO-SAXON AMERICA 57-58 (1914).
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the Ordenaqbes Filipinas, which was promulgated in 1603." 8 Al-
though often referred to as the C6digo Filipino, the Ordenaqbes was
not really a code. Rather it was a compilation of prior compilations,
which, in turn, had awkwardly amalgamated Roman law, the forais,
customary usage, the Visigothic Code, the Siete Partidas, canon law,
and the general legislation of Portugal since 1211. Much of its drafts-
manship was unclear to begin with, and it became such a hodgepodge
of overlapping and inconsistent amendments that a divining rod
seemed as sure a guide to legal research as any other method. Never-
theless, the Ordenaebes remained the bulwark of Brazil's civil law
until 1917, almost a century after independence and a full fifty years
after Portugal had relegated the Ordenaebes to the statutory
scrapheap.
2. Lei da Boa Razao (Law of Good Sense)
In the Lei de Boa Razdo, enacted in 1769, the Portuguese be-
queathed to the Brazilians a canon of statutory interpretation that
was a precursor of the jeito. This law made decisions of Portugal's
highest court a source of law with binding precendential value." It
also directed the judiciary to apply Roman law to fill legislative lacu-
nae only when it accorded with "good human sense." "Good human
sense," at least as defined by the statute, meant consistent with natu-
ral law, perceived as Roman ethical ideals formally recognized by the
legal rules and practices of Christian nations.
In practice, the Lei da Boa Razdo encouraged judges and lawyers
to look to common sense, custom, comparative legislation, and the
spirit of the law as the basis for decision when the OrdenaC.es was
unclear or omissive, which was often the case. The Lei de Boa Razdo
substantially increased the doctrinal freedom and legal discretion of
the Brazilian judiciary and bar at the expense of Roman law and Por-
tuguese statutory law. Orlando Gomes, one of Brazil's leading civil
law scholars, has suggested that the secret of the longevity of the
Ordenaebes in both Brazil and Portugal can be traced to its wealth of
omissions, coupled with so flexible a source of subsidiary law as good
sense.-5 Thus the Brazilian practice of reinterpreting laws in the light
of good sense had a spirtual ancestor in the Lei da Boa Razdo.
33. The Portuguese legal labyrinth was similar to that prevailing in the Spanish colonies,
although somewhat more confusing. After 1680 the Spanish colonies at least had the benefit of
the Recopilaci6n de Leyes de los Reynos de Indias, an official compilation of more than 6,300
laws and regulations affecting colonial life. Brazilians lacked even this crude sort of official
compilation.
34. 1 C. TRIPOLI, supra note 10, at 155-57.




3. The Weakness of Portuguese Control
With a population estimated at only one million in the fifteenth
century, Portugal lacked sufficient manpower to enforce rigid con-
trols over its widespread empire. Moreover, the Portuguese Crown re-
fused to spend sufficient funds in Brazil to create the infrastructure
necessary for effective law enforcement. Whereas Spanish rule over
much of the New World was facilitated by the prior existence of
tightly controlled, autocratic Indian civilizations, the Portuguese had
no such base upon which to build in Brazil.3 While in Portugal
power became increasingly centralized in the hands of the king,
power in Brazil became increasingly decentralized in the hands of
large landowners. Initially, Portugal ceded more extensive jurisdic-
tional powers to Brazil's original colonizers than did other colonial
powers and subsequently had greater difficulty reasserting royal au-
thority over the great landholders."7 Particularly in the backlands,
Portuguese administration was ineffective. Justice (what there was of
it) was in practice administered by coroneis (colonels), large land-
owners who controlled the military in their area.38 Gilberto Freyre
summarized the prevailing relationship succinctly: "Over [Brazil's co-
lonial aristocracy] the King of Portugal may be said, practically, to
have reigned without ruling. ''39
While the Portuguese never enshrined in positive law the cele-
brated Spanish administrative formula for not enforcing inconvenient
royal edicts-("I obey but do not comply"), 40 in practice the same
36. W. PIERSON & F. GIL, GOVERNMENTS OF LATIN AMERICA 70 (1957); E. BURNS, A His-
TORY OF BRAzIL 16 (1970).
37. See E. LAHMEYER LOBO, PROCEsso ADMINISTRATIVO IBERO-AMERICANo 454-58 (1962).
The text of one of these extensive grants appears in English translation in E. BURNS, A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY OF BRAZIL 33-50 (1966).
38. The Crown tried to curb their excesses at the end of the 17th century by enacting
legislation appointing resident magistrates every five leagues, as well as restricting the terms of
office of local military leaders, but the law understandably went unenforced. C. BOXER, THE
GOLDEN AGE OF BRAZIL 307 (1964).
39. G. FREYRE, THE MASTERS AND THE SLAVES 27 (1946).
40. Law 24, Book II, title 1 of the Recopilaci6n expressly recognized the right of Spanish
viceroys and other officials to stay the execution of orders where special circumstances rendered
their implementation inopportune. Writing in 1616, the great Spanish jurist, Castillo de
Bavidilla, explained the reasoning underlying this formula:
By laws of these realms it is provided that the royal provisions and decrees which are
issued contrary to justice and in prejudice of suitors are invalid and should be obeyed
and not executed... and the reason for this is that such provisions and mandates are
presumed to be foreign to the intention of the Prince, who as Justinian has said, cannot
be believed to desire by word or decree to subject and destroy the law established and
agreed to with great solicitude.
Noted in C. HARING, THE SPANISH EMPIRE IN AMERICA 114 (Harbinger ed. 1963).
There were clearly limits as to how much administrators could get away with under this
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principle was widely applied.41 Indeed, it is fair to state that the prin-
ciple of noncompliance was institutionalized. 2
Several other factors contributed to the weakness of Portuguese
administrative control over Brazil. Portugal punished serious crimes
with exile to Brazil, making the colony a dumping ground for social
misfits, whose respect for law and order was attenuated prior to arri-
val. In contrast with the English colonies, relatively few colonists
came to Brazil with any domicilliary intent. Most came with the in-
tention of reaping riches rapidly and returning posthaste to
Portugal."
Portugal's strict mercantilist policies and heavy taxation gave
Brazilians strong economic incentives to avoid compliance. Tax eva-
sion and smuggling became a way of life not only in Brazil, but also
in Portugal."
Even if Portuguese law had been clear and appropriately designed
for Brazilian conditions, and the colonial authorities had been in-
clined to enforce it, a gap between the law on the books and practice
would certainly have resulted from the lack of effective communica-
tions. One of the most striking features of Brazil is the enormity of
its land mass, which is larger than the continental United States and
twice that of Europe excluding Russia. Littoral areas are cut off from
the interior by sheer cliffs. Even today, roads are few and far be-
tween. Given the extreme precariousness of communications, deci-
sionmakers have had to fall back on improvisation.
E. Lack of Civic Responsibility and Personalismo
The Portuguese handed down to the Brazilians a weak sense of
loyalty and obligation towards the society in which they lived, and a
strong sense of loyalty and obligation towards family and friends. In
comparing the Portuguese character with the Spanish, Marcus Cheke
noted:
[A] trait that is common to both peoples is their lack of what
formula, although a great deal obviously slipped by. See Phelan, Authority and Flexibility in
the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy, 5 AD. ScL Q. 47, 59 (1960).
41. See E. LAHMEYER LOBO, supra note 37, at 434-44; M. KEMAN, THE INDIAN POLICY OF
PORTUGAL IN THE AMAZON REGION: 1614-1693 (1954).
42. E. WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 93.
43. G. FREyaE, supra note 39, at 85-86. After 1680, the caliber of colonists improved
markedly because some of Portugal's better families fled to Brazil to avoid Spanish subjugation.
Manchester, The Rise of the Brazilian Aristocracy, 11 Hisp. AM. HIsT. REV. 145, 147 (1931).
44. E. WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 97-98. Toward the end of the 18th century, the French
consul estimated that at least one-tenth of Lisbon's total population made their living from
contraband. Notations gknkrales sur le commerce de Portugal par/consul/Helfflinger (1786),
noted in D. ALDEN, supra note 27, at 389.
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may be termed "civic sense." Even more than the Spaniard,
the Portuguese is kind and charitable to five categories of per-
sons: to his family, to his friends, to the friends of his family,
to the friends of his friends, and lastly, to the beggar in his
path. But to other fellow citizens he acknowledges little
obligation.45
The proposition that the law should be applied even-handedly and
impersonally to all citizens conflicts with this Portuguese heritage.
The dominant attitude is reflected in the familiar Brazilian adage:
Para os amigos tudo, para os indiferentes nada, e para os inimigos a
lei (For friends, everything; for strangers, nothing; and for enemies,
the law). Family and friendship ties very frequently impose on Bra-
zilian bureaucrats the duty to bend the law; the duty to execute the
law in unbent form is usually relegated to a lesser plane. As a preemi-
nent student of national character has explained: "[T]he basic Brazil-
ian personality. . .stresses direct personal relations, based upon lik-
ing rather than unconditioned, impersonal, practical relations.
Personal liking is above the law."4
F. Profound Socio-Economic Inequality
From its inception, Brazilian society has been characterized by
profound socio-economic inequality. The initial colonization scheme
was the ill-fated captaincy system, which began the pattern by con-
veying enormous areas of land and effective sovereignty over these
areas to a dozen nobles. The pattern was continued in the socio-eco-
nomic system of the fazendas, large agrarian estates that still domi-
nate much of the Brazilian countryside. To this day income is highly
concentrated in Brazil, with a huge gulf separating the small upper
class and the burgeoning middle class from the great mass of the
population. 7
This profound socio-economic inequality has been accompanied
by de facto juridical inequality. Brazil has always had one law for its
elite and a very different law for its masses. Despite the constitu-
tional rhetoric of equality, in Brazil, as in much of the world, one's
45. The Portuguese Character, in PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL 42, 45 (H. Livermore ed. 1953).
46. J. RODRIGUEs, THE BRAzILIANs: THEIR CHARACTER AND ASPIRATIONS 57 (1967).
47. According to 1970 census data, the top 5% of Brazil's population received 36.3% of
the nation's income, while the bottom 40% of the population earned only 9%. W. BAR, THE
BRAzILAN ECONOMY 105 (2d ed. 1983). According to the most recent income data, in 1982 about
41% of the economically active population earned the minimum wage (roughly U.S. $80 to $100
per month) or less, while only 10.29% earned more than five times the minimum wage. Less
than 1% earned more than 20 times the minimum wage. National Research by Sampling of
Homes (PNA). Jornal do Brasil, Nov. 11, 1983, 1st cad., at 13, cols. 1-3.
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status and connections are critical variables governing actual applica-
tion of the law. 8 Particularly in dealings with the bureaucracy and
the police, the rules applied to the upper and middle classes differ
from those applied to the lower class. Vestiges of this class discrimi-
nation can still be found in formal legal structure, such as the re-
quirement that educated persons be detained in special jails. ' 9
G. Sentimentalism
A corollary of the emphasis on direct personal relations is the
coitado complex, the compassion and sympathy that Brazilians so
readily extend to those in unfortunate circumstances. If forced to opt
between helping someone whom he pities and respecting a rule of
law, the Brazilian frequently ignores the law. Emilio Willems, an an-
thropologist with extensive field work in Brazil, has observed that the
Brazilians sympathetically tolerate and accept human frailties. A
lawbreaker, particularly when a juvenile or a person motivated by
jealousy or vengeance, is often treated as a coitado (a poor soul) by
the public, and helped to escape. 0
The coitado is someone to be befriended, and once befriended,
that direct, personal obligation rises above an impersonal, abstract
legal norm. This national sentimentalism tends to soften the law's
rigors and to multiply instances of the jeito.
H. The Art of Compromise
"The key to Brazil's success in developing a strong, modern, and
humane society in tropical America has been its talent for compro-
mise. 1 1 This ability to conciliate and compromise has been devel-
oped into an art and a tradition by the Brazilians. This may have
resulted from the natural obstacles encountered in colonizing such a
vast territory with so few people and so little might. 2 The Portu-
guese were never able to impose their rule on the Indians and settlers
with the forcefulness and absolutism of the Spanish. They were also
48. See R. DA MATrA, CARNAVAIS, MALANDROS E Ha6xs 139-93 (2d ed. 1980).
49. Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 295 (1941).
50. Willems, Portuguese Culture in Brazil, Proceedings of the International History of
Latin American Civilization Coloquium on Luso-Brazilian Studies (1953), reprinted in 1 His-
TORY OF LATIN AmaEaCA CIVILIZATION 51, 57 (L. Hanke ed. 1967). This is, however, less likely
today to be true than it was at the time Willems wrote. Now public unhappiness with the high
urban crime rate has made lynching, another form of the jeito, an increasingly common public
reaction to serious crime.
51. G. FimxEm, NEw WORLD IN THE TRoPics 7 (1st Vintage Ed. 1963).
52. J. RODRIGUES, CONCIUAIO E REFORMA NO BRASIL 23-24 (1965). Vianna Moog has sug-
gested that the true origin of the jeito lies in the Brazilian's need to conquer the overwhelming
natural obstacles by subtlety and indirection. BAmnmwEAs z PIONRIRos 258-59 (8th ed. 1966).
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far less concerned than the Spanish with drawing color lines or theo-
logical orthodoxy.53 Brazil's history is replete with examples of crises
surmounted by resort to good sense and compromise instead of strict
adherence to the law or abstract philosophic doctrine." One cele-
brated example was the 1840 coronation of Dom Pedro II at the age
of fourteen in blatant disregard of the Constitution, which required
that Brazil's monarch be at least eighteen years old. 5 Although Bra-
zilian history is not without its episodes of violence, the country has
been spared the splintering and bloody revolutions that have charac-
terized the history of much of Latin America.56 The jeito can be
viewed as one manifestation of this proclivity, inherited from the
Portuguese, for finding pragmatic solutions to thorny problems.
III. THE LEGAL CULTURE: PATERNALISTIC, LEGALISTIC AND
FORMALISTIC
A. Paternalism
The paternalism that stemmed from the Portuguese monarchy,
the Catholic Church, and the extended patricarchal family still per-
meates Brazilian society. It is commonly expressed in the patrao (pa-
tron) complex of traditional Brazil. In return for fealty and service,
the patrto, a member of the local elite, customarily looks after the
interests of his employees, tenants, or debtors. The patrao plays the
role of protector, interceding with the authorities when any of his
flock is in trouble.57 This aspect of the patrao system serves to per-
sonalize and particularize legal relations for the lower class. The ulti-
mate patrao is the state, from which the Brazilians seem to expect
just about everything "from jobs, credit, high wages, health care, to
economic stability, and subsidies for carnival masquerades."58
Authority is tightly concentrated in Brazil, and is delegated most
reluctantly. As with many developing countries, almost all decisions,
even the most petty, must come from the top. A typical complaint is
that of Jarbas Passarinho, former Minister of Education, that no
sooner had he taken office than his subordinates began appearing
with "urgent" documents that required his signature: permission to
53. E. WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 147.
54. See generally J. RODRIGUES, supra note 52.
55. E. BURNS, supra note 36, at 122-23.
56. Keith, The Nonviolent Tradition in Brazilian History: A Myth in Need of Explosion,
and Love, Commentary in CoNLIwcT AN CoNTINUrTy IN BRAzILIAN SocIErY 231 (H. Keith & S.
Edwards eds. 1969).
57. See C. WAGLEY, AN INTRODUCION To BRAzn. 106-11 (1963).
58. Willems, Brazil, in THE INsTrrIrriONS OF ADVANCED SocmTIES 525 (A. Rose ed. 1958).
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unload 156 pieces of paper and a lease of a home for an inspector of
secondary education in the Northeast. Helio BeltrAo, Planning Min-
ister in the Costa e Silva regime and until recently Minister of
Debureaucratization, has observed:
The concentration of the power of decision at the highest
levels was, and still is, the most serious ill of the country's
administrative organism. The repugnancy for delegation has
been responsible for the incredible delay in solving the most
routine matters,. . .for the interminable routing of processes
for "higher consideration," and, in the final analysis, for the
demoralization of those governing, who see themselves sepa-
rated from the governed by a veritable bulwark of paper.6
The long waiting period during which documents wend their way to
the top encourages resort to the jeito.
Historically, elites have paternalistically bestowed constitutions
and laws upon the Brazilian populace with little regard or awareness
of the desires and capabilities of those governed.6 Instead of being
the product of popular pressures, an objective fact-finding study, or a
crystalization of custom, legislation is usually the product of what a
small group imagines would be ideal for the people. Thus, the labor
legislation that the Vargas regime enacted in the late 1930s and early
1940s paternalistically granted many benefits and protections to the
worker that have been the object of extensive struggles by labor
movements in other parts of the world. Paid vacations, maternity
benefits, job security, minimum wages, special treatment for women
and children, health and sanitary conditions on the job, were all
granted to employees in the Consolidated Labor Laws. Instead of cre-
ating a strong, independent labor movement, this legislation turned
the labor movement into a ward of the state. To this day labor has
remained dependent on the Ministry of Labor and the labor courts to
secure wage increases, better working conditions, and enforcement of
the labor laws, many of which have been more breached than
honored.62
59. Realidade of Mar. 1970, at 36.
60. Quoted in 0 Globo, Aug. 24, 1970, at 23.
61. 1 0. VUNA, INsTrrI OEs PoLrcAs BAs.snujAs 30, 149 (2d ed. 1955). The same point
has been made with respect to Latin America generally. Busey, Observations on Latin Ameri-
can Constitutionalism, 24 THE AmmuCAS 46 (1967).
62. Perhaps the most circumvented provisions have been the tenure and minimum wage
provisions. Since a worker could not be fired after ten years of service except for grave fault,
duly proven before the labor courts, employers routinely discharged workers just before com-
pleting the tenth year of service. When the labor courts began to treat nine and a half years as
equivalent to ten to prevent the practice, employers simply discharged employees sooner. Expo-
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The disparity between the government's and the people's views of
what is best has made Brazilians prone to act according to an old
adage-manda quem pode, obedece quem quer (he who can, com-
mands; he who wants to, obeys).
B. Legalism
Brazilian legal culture is highly legalistic; society places great em-
phasis upon seeing that all social relations are regulated by compre-
hensive legislation. Brazilians feel that new institutions or practices
ought not be adopted without prior legal authorization. As has been
said with reference to German legalism, Brazil has a "horror of a le-
gal vacuum."68 The country has reams of laws and decrees regulating
with great specificity every aspect of Brazilian life, as well as some
aspects of life not found in Brazil. It often appears that if something
is not prohibited by law, it must be obligatory.
Another facet of this legalistic mentality is the tendency to regard
as done that which is enacted into law. Brazil inherited from Portu-
gal the naive faith that almost any social or economic ill can be cured
by legal prescription. Brazil has continually repeated the colonial
pattern of Spain and Portugal by enacting laws with little regard for
the prospects of enforcement. Unenforceable laws have typically been
remedied by new laws, most of them equally unenforceable. The per-
sistence up to the present of the assumption that all problems can be
solved on a legal level is remarkable." Whether the society is willing
sition of Motives of the Law of the Fund of Guaranty of Service, Law 5.107 of Sept. 13, 1966; R.
ALEXANDER, LABOR RELATIONS IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 121-22 (1962). As in many
countries, minimum wage legislation has been impossible to enforce in Brazil, particularly in
the interior. Employees are frequently obliged to sign a paper indicating that they have been
receiving the legal minimum to satisfy the regional labor inspector, but it is an open secret that
many workers receive less. Even the federal government itself has been known to pay less than
the minimum wage.
63. H. SPmo, GOVERNMENT BY CONSTrrTroN 184 (1959).
64. E. WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 173. See also Viera, da Costa, & Barbosa, 0 "jeitinho"
brasileiro como um recurso de poder, 16 REV. AD. PuB. 5, 18 (abr/jun. 1982). Roberto de
Oliveira Campos, former planning minister and chief architect of President Castelo Branco's
economic program, once satirized the country's legalistic mentality by suggesting the following
bill to reduce the nation's high interest rates despite the acute inflation and great shortage of
credit:
Decree Law No. 001-Regulates the Law of Supply and Demand and prohibits the scar-
city of money or merchandise.
Article 1.-The Law of Supply is maintained.
Article 2.-The Law of Demand is repealed.
Article 3.-The natural or artificial scarcity of money or any other merchandise is
permanently prohibited.
Article 4.-The just profit shall be equal to 10 percent per annum, because we are all
born with ten fingers on our hands.
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and able to shoulder the costs of enforcement is seldom a suitable
topic for discussion.
Lawmakers are generally not content to set forth desired conduct
in general terms. They seem driven to try to anticipate and regulate
all possible future occurrences with detailed, comprehensive, and oc-
casionally incomprehensible legislation. Situations that should be left
to judges or administrators in other countries to work out on a case-
by-case basis under the rubric of "reasonableness" are preordained
by statute. For example, the Law of Directives and Bases of National
Education" attempts to spell out the nature and structure of pri-
mary, secondary, and university education for all of Brazil. The stat-
ute establishes uniform curricula, schedules, and programs for the en-
tire country. Article 92 states: "The Union shall apply annually for
the maintenance and development [of education] 12 percent of its
tax receipts, and a minimum of 20 percent for the States, Federal
District and the Counties." With good reason, provisions of this type
have seldom been honored. This legislative style reflects a deep-
seated mistrust of those administering and interpreting the laws, as
well as the entire legalistic and codifying tradition of the civil law,
which exalts certainty as a supreme value.s
Evidence of legalism can be found everywhere. Little stands on
street corners sell copies of the latest laws. Questions such as whether
a particular student was properly failed or which professor won a
competition to be a chair professor are regularly litigated, even car-
ried to the nation's highest court.7 A separate court system has been
set up to resolve disputes growing out of sporting events, particularly
soccer matches. Even when behaving arbitrarily and unconstitution-
ally, Brazilian governments feel compelled to go through a legalistic
charade."8
Os Pseudojuristas, in ENsAMos COMMA A MAt 47, 50 (1969).
65. Law No. 4.024 of Dec. 20, 1961.
66. J. MRRRYMAN, THE CrVIm LAW TRADION 50-51 (1969). See generally H. Spmo, supra
note 63, at 211-36.
67. E.g., UniAo Federal v. Camin, RE 56.595, 33 RTJ 738 (S.T.F. 1965); Uniao Federal v.
Rocha Castro, RE 59.496, 40 RTJ 492 (S.T.F. 1966).
68. For example, when the Vargas regime confiscated the estate of Paul de Leuze, a
wealthy French newspaper owner, whose sole heir was a nephew, the government did not sim-
ply appropriate the estate; the wealth transfer was "legalized" by enactment of a statute retro-
actively disinheriting any nephew claiming as an heir, thereby producing an escheat. See K.
LOEWZNS aN, BRAzn. UNDzR VARGAS 46-49 (1942). Similarly, when Costa e Silva suffered an
incapacitating stroke in 1969, the reins of government were lifted by a junta of the heads of the
armed forces, despite the constitutional provision for succession by the vice president (in this
case a civilian). The official explanation given was that there had been no "succession" in the
constitutional sense. The junta was merely acting as attorneys of the stricken president. This
extra-legal takeover was then "legalized" by Institutional Act No. 12 of Aug. 31, 1969, the 12th
of a series of 17 such measures promulgated by fiat of the military group that assumed the
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Legalism has contributed to the jeito's popularity in two ways: it
has led to an abundance of regulatory legislation, and a failure to
build sufficient flexibility into that regulation. The jeito can be
viewed as a legalistic response to both problems.
C. Formalism
Closely related to legalism is the exaggerated concern with legal
formalities. Every nation has some formalistic behavior, but Brazilian
concern with authenticity and verification is both impressive and op-
pressive. For example, prior to 1980, ensuring that a power of attor-
ney executed in the United States would be given legal effect for the
purpose of transferring real property in Brazil required the following
seven procedures:
(1) execution of the power of attorney before a notary in the
United States, (2) authentication of the notary's signature
with the clerk of the local court, (3) authentication of the sig-
nature of the clerk of the court before the Brazilian consul in
the United States, (4) authentication of the Brazilian consul's
signature with the Foreign Office in Brazil,69 (5) translation of
the power into Portuguese by an official translator, (6) regis-
tration of the power with the Registry of Instruments and
Documents, and (7) registration of the power with the appro-
priate Registry of Real Property.
Foreigners may be validly divorced abroad, but before Brazilian
officials will accord the foreign decree any validity, the document
must be translated by the Foreign Office and homologated by the Su-
preme Federal Tribunal. Cashing a traveler's check at a government
bank requires presentation of one's passport or identity card, supply-
ing a local address and telephone number, signing numerous copies of
a form, which is then typed up, stamped, and initialed by a regiment
of bank clerks. Although the government has streamlined the process
somewhat as part of an energetic campaign to stimulate exports, se-
curing an export license in 1981 was reported to involve 1,470 sepa-
rate legal actions with thirteen government ministries and fifty agen-
cies." Even registering to vote may take weeks to secure the
approvals of a dozen different governmental agencies. Then one must
prove that one has been registered to vote in every previous place of
duties of a continuous constitutional convention in the name of the revolution.
69. This exigency was eliminated by a debureaucratization measure, Decree No. 85.541 of
Jan. 31, 1980.
70. Freed, "Brazil Bureau Is Battling Bureaucracy," Miami Herald, May 15, 1981, at 9c,
cols. 3-6.
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residence. Moreover, ofttimes an approval from one government
agency expires before all other necessary documentation is in order,
requiring one to begin the process anew.
The presumption appears to be that every citizen is lying unless
he produces written, documentary proof that he is telling the truth.
The formal legal system, whether ascertaining criminal guilt or issu-
ing employment benefits, displays a decided tendency to believe only
documents and not people. Helio Beltr~o's personal experience as
Planning Minister bears this out well. A decree which he submitted
to the President for consideration in 1968 was perceived as scandal-
ous because it abolished the requirement that an official document
certifying one is alive be presented by anyone personally appearing at
the appropriate government department to collect his pension. The
formalistic legal system was far more comfortable with documentary
proof that the person at the window was indeed alive. 1
Another facet of formalism is the obvious discrepancy between
conduct and the legal rules designed to regulate such conduct.
Brazilians commonly refer to laws in much the same manner as one
refers to vaccinations: there are those that take, and those that do
not.72 It was only partly in jest that Capistrano de Abreu, one of the
nation's most distinguished historians, proposed, as a panacea for
Brazil's ills, passage of the following law:
Article 1. The law shall be obeyed.
Article 2. All dispositions to the contrary shall be
revoked.7
Many factors explain the prevalence of formalism in Brazil, and
indeed for much of Latin America as well. Independence brought lit-
tle relief from legislation ill-suited to the demands of Brazilian soci-
ety. In general, Brazilian laws have not been autochthonous; most
have been imported wholesale from Europe or the United States with
little, if any, consideration given to their suitability for transplanta-
tion to Brazilian soil.
The failure to tailor laws to Brazilian needs is largely attributable
to the legislative process. Most Brazilian legislation has been drafted
71. 0 Globo, Aug. 24, 1970, at 23.
72. Francisco Campos, Vargas' durable Minister of Justice, was reported to have re-
sponded to the criticism that a new law was identical to one that Campos himself had written
only a year earlier, by saying: "There is no harm done, my son. We are going to publish this one
now because the other did not take." Correio da Manh, Dec. 11, 1966, 4th cad., at 3. Roberto
Campos, economic czar in the Castelo Branco regime, is also reputed to have adhered to the
same approach. Viera, da Costa & Barbosa, supra note 64, at 18.
73. Jornal do Brasil, Oct. 18, 1967, 1st cad., at 6.
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by distinguished jurists or law professors in an atmosphere far re-
moved from the clamor of special interest groups. The draftsmen
have typically consulted the various solutions to the problem that
have been enacted abroad and tried to select one that, as an abstract
proposition, appears best, rather than seek a rule that crystallizes
custom or practice. Seldom has there been a fact finding inquiry
about the peculiarly Brazilian nature of the economic, social, politi-
cal, or administrative problems involved. Disputes among jurists and
professors about the rule being adopted are frequent, but these are
typically technical, doctrinal disputes. The end product of this pro-
cess has been the legislation of idealized standards of behavior, con-
tinuing a tradition that harks back to Portugal's adoption of Roman
law.
1. Legal Science and Legal Education
Brazilian legal education has been overwhelmingly formalistic. Al-
most exclusive emphasis has been placed upon classical exegesis of
the formal legal text. Little effort has been devoted to examination of
how particular rules function in practice. Legal study has been fo-
cused on understanding rules of law and has ignored the conduct of
the persons affected by these rules.74
Legal science has heavily influenced many, though by no means
all, of Brazil's lawyers. Generations of Brazilian law students have
been taught that law is a science, and that the task of the legal scien-
tist is to analyze and elaborate principles that can be derived from a
careful study of positive legislation into a harmonious, systematic
structure. The components of this system are believed to be purely
legal, a set of ultimate truths related by rigorous deductive logic.
Hence, the legal scientist's inquiry is almost exclusively directed to-
wards the legal rule. Although he may pay lip service to facts derived
from nonlegal disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, political
science, or economics, the legal scientist actually ignores nonlegal
facts because they detract from his search for absolute principles and
74. The prevailing attitude is stated in a classic introductory text by a former member of
Brazil's highest court:
Obedience to the juridical order is not conditioned on the opinion or the acquiescence
of the subject: lex iubet, aut vetat. The relation between rule and conduct is subordina-
tion, not causality. The juridical imperative is, as defined by B. Somlo, "the expression of
will that is directed to the behavior of a third party, without worrying about whether this
third party is disposed to abide by it."
H. LIMA, INTRODU (O A CANCIA Do DnmrrO 35 (15th ed. 1966). See generally Steiner, Legal
Education and Socio-Economic Change: Brazilian Perspectives, 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 39 (1971);
Rosenn, The Reform of Legal Education in Brazil, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251 (1969).
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the true nature of legal institutions.
Viewing law as a science and legal education as a means of dog-
matically imparting the true meaning of legal rules has led to a di-
vorce between the formal legal system and actual conduct. One of
Brazil's leading jurists, the late Santiago Dantas, perceived the prob-
lem clearly in a seminal address calling for a reform in legal
education:
In the study of abstract legal rules presented as a system one
can easily lose the sense of the social, economic, or political
relationship the law is intended to control. The legal system
has a logical and rational value, autonomous, so to speak. The
study we make of this system, with strictly deductive and a
priori methods, leads to a condition of self-sufficiency which
enables the jurist to turn his back on the society and lose in-
terest in the matter regulated as well as in the practical signif-
icance of the legal solution. 5
2. Strategies for Promoting or Avoiding Social Change
There is more to formalism, however, than legal science and the
superimposition of imported forms ill-suited to Brazilian needs. In
certain instances formalism may be a conscious strategy for promot-
ing social change. This thesis has been elaborated by Guerreiro Ra-
mos, who argues that in the Brazilian historical context, formalism
has been an important strategy adopted by the elite in order to forge
a nation. 6 In his view, "Formalism is not a bizarre characteristic, a
sign of social pathology. . ., but a normal and regular fact that re-
flects a global strategy of [transitional] societies through which they
attempt to move beyond their current stage."' 77 Given the rudimen-
tary state of Brazilian society in the nineteenth century, any institu-
tional framework that the architects of the legal system wished to
adopt was necessarily formalistic.
Many of the legal institutions that the elite imported had essen-
tially hortatory and aspirational functions. Although Brazil may have
lacked the social and political infrastructure that would allow the
constitutional system imported from the United States to function in
1891, the hope was that Brazilian society would evolve sufficiently to
convert the constitutional theory into practice. While persuasive,
Guerreiro Ramos' theory is unsupported by historical evidence.
75. A Educaqdo Jurldica e a Crise Brasileira, 13-14 REv. JURIDICA 7, 18 (1955).
76. Supra note 6, at 387-93.
77. Id. at 365.
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Whether supportive evidence will ever be adduced is uncertain. 8
Conversely, one can argue that there are cases where formalism
has been adopted as a conscious strategy for averting social change.
In Brazil, as in a great many developing nations, it is frequently eas-
ier and less socially divisive for opponents of legislation aimed at ef-
fecting fundamental changes in the society to prevent implementa-
tion rather than enactment. Proponents of basic reforms are
accorded a symbolic victory, but in practice nothing changes because
supporters of the status quo have sufficient political and economic
power to defeat the reform at the administrative level.
In 1964, the Brazilian Congress passed an elaborate and largely
unintelligible land reform statute,79 similar in many respects to the
bill that the Congress had rejected a year earlier when Goulart had
occupied the presidency. The law's passage was assured by confi-
dence that the new military government would leave land reform at
the formalistic level. This confidence was not misplaced. In the years
since enactment, there has been much study, a constitutional amend-
ment, more legislation, and the creation and abolition of administra-
tive agencies to deal with the problem, but little land reform.80
IV. THE BUREAUCRATIC IMBROGLIO
Intertwined with the problem of formalism and essential to a
comprehension of the persistence of the jeito is the nature of the
Brazilian bureaucracy. Historically, the bureaucracy has served as a
means of employing educated persons whom the private sector could
not absorb. This practice has imparted a "make work" character that
has continued to the present day. Since the late 1930s, when the first
Vargas regime began to intervene earnestly in the operation of the
economy, the proliferation of New Deal-like governmental agencies
has greatly swollen the bureaucratic ranks. It appears that the most
favored solution to any given problem is the creation of a new agency
to deal with it. The recent proliferation of governmental agencies is
truly astonishing. Each agency accumulates staff and soon acquires a
vested interest in maintaining, if not enlarging, its own area of super-
vision. It is not uncommon for the jurisdiction of a new agency to
overlap with that of an existing agency. Each agency is a law unto
78. The same difficulty surrounds this theory as advanced for other Latin American coun-
tries. See Busey, supra note 61.
79. Law No. 4.504 of Nov. 30, 1964.
80. M. CEHELSKY, LAND REFORM IN BPAzU.: THE MANAGEMEwT oF SOCIAL CHANG 223-25
(1979). According to a report recently submitted to SUDENE, the principal development
agency for the Northeast, landholding in the Northeast has become increasingly concentrated
since enactment of the land reform law. Jornal do Brasil, Nov. 16, 1983, 1st cad., at 7, cols. 1-2.
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itself; one agency sometimes vetoes permissions or projects approved
by another.
As in most developing nations, there are critical shortages of well-
trained personnel and equally critical surpluses of unemployed or
under-employed persons. Voters are easily attracted by the promise
of governmental jobs, and the Brazilians have kindly refrained from
dismissing civil servants when regimes change. Despite longstanding
civil service legislation providing for selection on the basis of compet-
itive examinations, positions have historically been filled by the pis-
tolao (literally, the big gun; hence, anyone who uses his power and
influence on behalf of others). In 1969, it was estimated that a maxi-
mum of 89,000 out of the approximately 500,000 in the federal ser-
vice, or about 17.8 percent, had entered by merit examinations,"' a
sad indication that the civil service law8 2 is simply another of the
many statutes that "have not taken."
Political clientage, which began under the patrdo system of tradi-
tional rural Brazil, still dominates the bureaucratic structure.83 One
who owes his job to political clientage is more likely to do favors for
family or friends. Moreover, the influx of large numbers of untrained
and unqualified personnel has itself generated more red tape, par-
tially to give superfluous employees something to do, and partially to
diffuse responsibility so that fixing blame for incompetence becomes
more difficult. Attraction and retention of top-flight talent has been
seriously hampered by low governmental salaries that have not kept
pace with inflation and increasing competition from the private sec-
tor. 4 Large numbers of civil servants have at least one other daytime
job; many show up only to collect their paychecks.
Bureaucratic practices are designed to promote administrative
inefficiency. Many departments are open only a few hours a day, and
a multiplicity of documents is required to substantiate any claim. Of-
ficial documents usually require stamps, which must be purchased
elsewhere than the agency processing the documents. Governmental
forms must be purchased separately from commercial stationers; un-
til the late 1960s, even income tax returns had to be purchased.
81. Lambert, Trends in Administrative Reform in Brazil, 1 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 167, 181
(Pt. II, Nov. 1969). Circumvention of civil service requirements was particularly blatant when
Kubitscheck and Goulart were in power; attempts were then made to bestow permanent status
on thousands of temporary employees. See Siegel, The Strategy of Public Administration Re-
form: The Case of Brazil, 26 PuB. AD. REv. 45, 52-53 (1966).
82. Law No. 284 of Oct. 28, 1936.
83. See Pearse, Some Characteristics of Urbanization in the City of Rio de Janeiro, in
URBAIZATION IN LATIN AmzRicA 191, 202 (P. Hauser ed. 1961).
84. Between 1974 and 1982, salaries of federal government employees declined 41% in
real terms. In 1983, federal salaries rose only 78.7% in the face of an inflation rate of 211%.
Jornal do Brasil, Dec. 18, 1983, 1st cad., at 33, col. 1.
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Processing fees often must be paid at commercial banks and the re-
ceipts presented to the processing agency. Typically, Brazilians need-
ing governmental authorizations or documents are compelled to go
from one agency to another, enduring many slow-moving lines before
arranging all the necessary pieces of paper and stamps. Citizens are
then often forced to wait weeks, months, or years while the process is
sent up for "higher consideration.""8
In this setting it is relatively simple for civil servants to rational-
ize levying direct taxes upon those members of the public requiring
their services. Brazilians complain, and not without justification, that
"gles criam dificuldades s6 para vender facilidades" (they create dif-
ficulties only to sell solutions).
A. The Despachante
The jeito normally operates hand in glove with another Brazilian
institution, the despachante (roughly, an expediter), who has coun-
terparts in many nations. The omnipresent despachante, who lubri-
cates Brazil's sticky administrative process, has become a thriving,
specialized professional, complete with his own union and competi-
tive examinations. Some despachantes handle only customs matters;
others specialize in police work, naturalization, auto licenses, mar-
riages, or "legalization of real estate."8' In 1970, the yellow pages of
Rio's phone book contained more than 300 separate listings for
despachantes.
The despachante is an intermediary who, in return for a commis-
sion or fee, purchases and fills out the multiplicity of legal forms,
delivers them to the proper persons, and extracts the needed permis-
sion or document. Even when a despachante is not legally required,
it is often impossible to secure anything quickly from the bureau-
cracy without one. Securing necessary documents can be so difficult
85. Peter Bell, former President of the Inter-American Foundation, relates the experience
of a professor from Minas Gerais who waited ten years for a tax refund and then made the
diabolically magnanimous gesture of donating to the government the entire refund, by this time
a trifling sum because of inflation. The startled tax official pleaded earnestly with the professor
to forego his civil gesture, for the procedure to enable the treasury to accept the gift was
equally lengthy and involved. Brazil, in TowARDs STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 89, 92 (J. Honey ed. 1968).
86. Despachantes who arrange for the importation and exportation of goods have long
enjoyed a legal monopoly. Only those authorized by presidential decree and their assistants
may process papers before the customs officials. Decree-Law No. 4.014 of Jan. 13, 1942, Art. 1.
Customs despachantes receive governmental authorization to ply their trade only after passing
an examination on their knowledge of customs practice and serving a two year apprenticeship.
Id. at Art. 14. Until 1968, not even the owner could go through the laborious process of ex-
tracting his goods from customs without an authorized despachante. Decree-Law No. 366 of
Dec. 19, 1968.
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that it is not uncommon for one government agency to employ a
despachante to extract something from another. The simplest trans-
actions, such as obtaining a marriage license or identity card, can
take days, or months, or even longer, depending on whether one has
used a despachante and how much he has been paid.
The despachante functions effectively because he knows how to
fill out the bewildering variety of forms, to whom the copies should
be delivered, and what documentation will be required. He attends to
several matters at the same time and is adept at breaking in ahead of
the long lines of persons waiting to handle their own affairs.87 Most
importantly, he operates expeditiously because he has cultivated
friends in the bureaucracy. This cultivation is frequently fertilized by
the turnover of a portion of his fee or by appropriate Christmas or
birthday presents. Of course, if one is fortunate enough to have a
friend, or a friend of a friend, in the right governmental office, the
services of the despachante can be foregone. Were it not for the jeito
and the despachante, the entire administrative apparatus of Brazil
would grind to a halt.
B. Administrative Reform
For the past forty years a series of unsuccessful attempts have
been made to reform Brazil's ungainly, bloated, inefficient public ad-
ministration. These efforts have been directed primarily through an
elite centralized agency, the Administrative Department of Public
Service (DASP), and substantial inputs of foreign technical assis-
tance. The reasons for this failure are complex; the core of the prob-
lem has been an underlying political structure and a set of cultural
values that have not been conducive to implementation of a merit
system.88
Operating on the theory that modernization and development re-
quire impersonal, predictable, and efficient administrative behavior,
the military regimes ruling the country since the 1964 seizure of
power have given administrative reform high priority. A series of
measures, clustering around Decree-Law No. 200 of February 25,
1967, was introduced to decentralize decision-making and reduce red
tape. Between March 1967 and the end of 1969, some 347 govern-
87. One practical reason for permitting the despachante to avoid the long lines of people
handling their own affairs is that the despachante's papers are normally in order, while the
bulk of people trying to cope with the bureaucracy on their own are ill-informed and lack the
necessary documentation, at least on the first few visits. Dealing directly with despachantes
makes the public servant appear more efficient.
88. See L. GRAHAM, CIvIL SERVICE REFORM IN BRAZIL: PRINcPLEs VERsus PRACTicE 59-182




mental departments were reorganized and nearly two-thirds of the
steps in their document processing were eliminated. The military also
sought to reduce the large numbers of superfluous civil servants by
pensioning them off. In addition, sizeable numbers were dismissed for
corruption or political reasons. The result was a modest improvement
in bureaucratic efficiency.
In July 1979, the government decided to deal with the problem of
bureaucratic inefficiency in a characteristically Brazilian fashion, by
creating a special Ministry of Debureaucratization. Headed initially
by Helio BeltrAo, former Minister of Planning, this new agency has
thus far issued a series of sensible decrees simplifying many bureau-
cratic procedures. 89 Unfortunately, the bureaucracy has also dealt
with the Ministry of Debureaucratization in typical Brazilian fashion,
ignoring many of its debureaucratization measures. Reacting to nu-
merous complaints about the disregard of the reforms, Beltrao coun-
tered with a decree requiring the bureaucracy to take the Ministry of
Debureaucratization seriously.90 The debureaucratization measures
have also created a modest improvement in administrative efficiency
in the past few years.
V. PENETRATION OF THE FORMAL LEGAL SYSTEM
Brazil's formal legal system has all the earmarks of a modern, de-
veloped institutional structure. At its heart are the Constitution and
comprehensive basic codes of civil, criminal, and commercial law, as
well as criminal and civil procedure. The Constitution is modeled af-
ter that of the United States, while the basic codes are largely drawn
from European models. Disputes within the formal legal system are
resolved by a heirarchical arrangement of courts on the basis of the
wording and legislative history of the statutory rules, scholarly doc-
trine, opinions of distinguished jurists, and prior court decisions.
This part of the legal system is administered by a specially trained,
highly influential group of law professionals-lawyers, judges, and
notaries.
The formal system has gradually begun to penetrate into the inte-
rior of Brazil, but this penetration is far from complete. Large areas
of this huge country are still inaccessible, despite improvements in
89. The pamphlet, Desburocratizaqao-medidas adotadas (Presidncia da Repfblica,
Programa Nacional de DesburocratizacAo-Mar. 1981), summarizes the first 148 of these
measures.
90. Decree No. 84.585 of Mar. 24, 1980, providing that all requests for information from
the Ministry of Debureaucratization must receive priority, that the general public must be al-
lowed to complain to the noncomplying agency, and that any offending agency must modify its
procedures to comply with the new debureaucratization measures.
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modern communications and transportation. Much of the rural inte-
rior still is only nominally under the control of the formal authorities.
The great bulk of the rural population is still largely unaffected by
the formal legal structure. Its disputes are resolved by patreoes, pa-
terfamilias, or large landowners in accordance with local custom.' 1
Although the situation is changing, especially since the military take-
over in 1964, federal and even state law 'is little known or enforced in
much of the interior.2 Continued tolerance of a system of local au-
thority is a tacit compromise, with the local bosses delivering the ru-
ral vote to federal and state authorities in exchange for ample extra-
legal autonomy.93 The tradition is "to render justice to one's friends
and to apply the law to one's adversaries."' 4
Not only in rural regions has penetration of the legal system been
limited. Millions of urban Brazilians live in favelas, squatter settle-
ments that ring all major cities. Penetration of formal legal structure
in the favela is fragmentary and precarious, for the favela's very exis-
tence is of doubtful legality. Instead, the favela is governed by a mix-
ture of the formal legal system and an informal, customary system, as
well as a curious set of laws and regulations designed to permit the
formal authorities to deal with the favelados without having to ac-
knowledge the lawfulness of the favela's existence.'8
A. Caligula Revisited-Finding the Governing Law
Resort to the formal system even in modern, urban sectors is
greatly hampered by difficulties in ascertaining its provisions. Calig-
ula, the tyrannical Roman emperor, was reputed to have had his laws
and decrees posted high off the ground where none of the populace
could read them. Brazilian methods are not so obvious, but they are
91. See Steiner, supra note 74, at 46.
92. Jacques Lambert's observations in the mid-1950s are essentially valid today.
But when one leaves the "new country" in which the Government's action is exercised
directly, federal and even state legislation is weakened by intervention of local authori-
ties, whose command is more respected thin that of the distant Government. The man
of the interior is accustomed to go to the local authorities to seek protection against laws
which he does not know and fears, instead of going to functionaries of the Central Gov-
ernment to ask them to apply the law. In spite of centralizing institutions, the old Brazil
effectively continues decentralized, because the uniform... law is not respected or even
known.
J. LAMaBT, Os Dois Bisis 238 (2d ed. 1967).
93. V. NumNs LAL, CORONELISMO, ENXADA 9 VOTO: 0 MuNmICPIo E o REGME REPREasNTA-
'ivo No BRmns 8, 31 (1948).
94. Id. at 158.
95. See generally S. CONN, THE SQuArriR's RIGHTS OF FAvFaADos (CIDOC Cuaderno No.
32, 1969); Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality
in Pasargada, 12 L. & Soc'Y REv. 5 (1977).
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frequently more effective. Discovering the governing law in Brazil is
nearly as perplexing and difficult a task today as in colonial times.
The myriad forms of the federal government's positive law-the
Constitution, amendments, institutional acts, complementary laws,
decree-laws, laws, decrees, regulations, resolutions, ordinances, circu-
lars, instructions, etc.-are published in the Didrio Oficial, the offi-
cial gazette. (There are corresponding publications at the state level.)
Technically, Brazilian laws and decrees must be published in the
Didrio Oficial or other official organs in order to produce a juridical
effect. 9" Nevertheless, not all Brazilian legislation is published. Brazil
has "invisible legislation" that is deliberately kept from public view.
Many of these secret decrees are reputed to deal with national secur-
ity, but some deal with' such apparently innocuous subjects such as
creation of a special fund for autonomous organs for research or
teaching on industry, commerce, or agriculture. Moreover, regula-
tory agencies, such as CACEX and INPI, often operate with secret
directives for the regulation of importation or the approval of tech-
nology transfer agreements."8
Publication of legislation in the Didrio Oficial by no means en-
sures that anyone will be able to find it later. The federal Didrio
Oficial, is unindexed, undigested, and occasionally unreadable. Useful
unofficial indexes of legislation are published from time to time, but
they are frequently outdated. 99 There is a semi-official collection of
laws and decrees called the Coleqdo das Leis do Brasil, but its preca-
rious indexing is on a volume-by-volume basis. Since 1937, an unoffi-
cial collection of laws and decrees, Coleqto Lex, has been published;
it too suffers from incompleteness and precarious indexing, also on a
volume-by-volume basis, albeit with an occasional multi-volume
index.
Whether one finds a particular law or decree frequently depends
upon luck and the caption's phraseology. Even at the federal level, no
official codification integrating the multiplicity of legislative pro-
nouncements on any given subject exists. While an attempt is made
from time to time to integrate the myriad income tax statutes, these
96. W. AccioLm, INSTITUIPOES DE Dniaro CONsTrruciONAL 344 (2d ed. 1981); 2 M.
CALPrANO, DimiTo CONSTrrucoNAL 334 (1978); 3 PONTES DE MIRANDA, COMFNTAR1OS A CON-
STITUIVAO DR 1967, 177 (1967); 62 ENCICLOPEDIA SARAIVA DO DiRmO 427-73 (1977).
97. Decreto Reservado No. 5 of July 12, 1979. See generally Jornal do Brasil, July 7, 1983,
1st cad., at 10, cols. 1-2.
98. See Rosenn, Trends in Brazilian Regulation of Business, 13 LAw. AM. 169, 173
(1981).
99. These private compilations, such as the Vademecum Forense and the Carteira da
Revista Forense, collect most of the basic statutes and some of the decrees, but they are far
from complete. They perform some, but by no means all, of the task of integrating the jumble
of conflicting and complementary laws.
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official compilations, misleadingly labelled "Regulations," are incom-
plete, sometimes incorrect, and quickly obsolete. Instead of changing
code provisions, Brazilian practice is to adopt supplemental legisla-
tion. To determine the governing law, one is often required to
unearth a number of separate statutes and decrees dealing within a
given subject and then undertake the jigsaw job of piecing together
the provisions still in force.100
No one really knows how many laws are in force in Brazil. Instead
of specifically repealing obsolete legislation, virtually all new legisla-
tion ends with an article declaring that all laws inconsistent with this
law are hereby revoked. The explanation for this legislative modus
operandi is simple: no one really knows which laws conflict with the
measure being enacted. Aliomar Baleeiro, when still a member of the
Supreme Federal Tribunal, estimated the number of laws in force in
Brazil at 65,000. The late Pontes de Miranda, Brazil's most prolific
jurist, lowered that estimate by about one-third in the process of re-
marking on the absurdity of expecting a lawyer to function in a legal
system with 45,000 laws in force.10 1
It is not simply the huge number of laws in force that generates
confusion, but also the poor quality of so many laws and regulations.
All too often new Brazilian legislation overlaps with existing legisla-
tion and is dreadfully drafted.10 2 Rarely can one understand a new
measure without simultaneously looking at a number of prior stat-
utes and decrees. One must also await clarifying decrees and regula-
tions to find out what a new law really means. Even then one is never
sure, for regulations typically repeat verbatim or paraphrase the
words of the statute. Tax laws, which can be issued by executive de-
cree, tend to suffer more than most legislation from hasty draftsman-
ship and inadequate conceptualization.
The process is illustrated by the government's effort to raise the
rates on the Tax on Financial Transactions (IOF: Impbsto sobre
Opera qes Financeiras) and to expand its scope. Without any public
discussion or even notice, the government simply issued a decree-law
tripling the tax rate on most credit transactions.'0 3 This decree-law
100. See H. FERNANDES PINHEIRO, T19CNICA LEGISLATIVA (2d ed. 1962), presenting a tour of
the technical aspects of elaborating Brazilian laws, as well as a collection of horrors of past
efforts.
101. Address at the University of Brasilia Law School, Jornal do Brasil, May 27, 1980, at
10, cols. 1-2.
102. For example, so many different rent control laws were enacted between 1942 and
1964 that no fewer than 18 different regimes regulating rentals were simultaneously in force.
Statement of Motives, Law No. 4.494 of Nov. 25, 1964, sec. XI.
103. Decree-Law No. 1.783 of Apr. 18, 1980. The tax's name was also changed to the Tax
on Credit, Foreign Exchange, Insurance, and Securities Transactions (Imp6sto sobre Opera,6es
de Cr~dito, CAmbio e Seguro e Normas Relativas a Titulos e Valores MobiliArios), but the ab-
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also doubled the IOF rate on insurance premiums, imposed a ten per-
cent tax on purchase of securities on credit, and effectively produced
a partial, unannounced devaluation by imposing a fifteen percent tax
on the purchase of foreign exchange to cover imports.10 4 This dra-
matic boost in tax rates, the expansion of the types of taxable trans-
actions, and the failure to provide for any exemptions produced a
huge outcry from affected interests. Great uncertainty also prevailed
as to the tax basis. Was the revamped IOF to be calculated solely on
the principal amount, or were financing costs and monetary correc-
tion to be included in the tax base? The Central Bank, which is
charged with administering the IOF, quickly began issuing a series of
resolutions and circulars "clarifying" the scope of the IOF and creat-
ing exceptions. 10 Some of these measures merely modified a prior
clarification.
The life of this series of resolutions and circulars was extraordina-
rily short. All were revoked by Central Bank Resolution No. 619 of
May 29, 1980, which contains forty pages of detailed regulations, in-
cluding a long list of exemptions. This Resolution is unnecessarily
complex and difficult to understand, particularly since many rules re-
fer the reader back to prior Central Bank rules. In addition to these
drafting and conceptualization problems, the reformulation of the
IOF suffered from another serious defect: its application to 1980
transactions violated the constitutional precept against
retroactivity.106
An editorial by one of Brazil's leading newspapers summed up the
chaotic state of Brazil's legal system in these terms:
Since it is impossible to know our law, given the excess of le-
gal texts theoretically in circulation, new laws have been made
on the supposition that they will affect areas still unregulated.
The result is that there are laws which in part repeat them-
selves, laws which contradict themselves, and laws which re-
sult from pure speculation without contact with social reality.
Consequently, these laws have only formal validity, remaining,
as Miguel Reale has said, "in the limbo of normativity."
Problems arise; one makes new laws designed to solve them.
breviation IOF has been retained.
104. The tax rate was subsequently increased to 25%. Decree-Law No. 1.844 of Dec. 30,
1980.
105. Cent. Bank Res. No. 610 of Apr. 18, 1980; Cent. Bank Res. No. 612 of May 8, 1980;
Cent. Bank Circ. No. 523 of Apr. 23, 1980; Cent. Bank Circ. No. 525 of Apr. 30, 1980; Cent.
Bank Circ. No. 530 of May 8, 1980.
106. Uniflo Federal e Banco Central do Brasil v. J. Alves Verissimo S.A. - Indfistria,
Com6rcio e ImportaAo, RE No. 97.749 (S.T.F. en banc, Nov. 10, 1982), 151 REv. Din. AD. 29
(1983).
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But these laws are not applied and the problems continue and
worsen. The Brazilian becomes ensnarled in this normative
mess, therefore, in which he becomes immobilized and loses
hope, be he a public servant or merchant, a handyman or in-
dustrialist. This is because when he least expects it, a bureau-
crat pulls from his desk a legal provision, as if it were a gun,
and shoots the citizen who wishes to engage in any kind of
productive activity.
1 0 7
The image of bureaucrats firing legal missiles to kill productive ac-
tivity is most apt. No one really knows how much government regula-
tion reduces Gross National Product, nor how much inflation is at-
tributable to maintaining Brazil's huge bureaucracy and absorbing
the costs of bureaucratic bungling, but both figures are surely strik-
ingly high.
In contrast to this superabundance of legislative and administra-
tive measures, many decisions of important tribunals, including the
nation's highest court, remain unpublished. Since there is no doctrine
of stare decisis (although the introduction of the Smula in 1964 was
a step in that direction),108 it is common to find numerous decisions
on both sides of a given question. Indexing of reported cases is unre-
liable and sketchy at best; it depends on the terminology employed in
the headnote. One looks in vain for comprehensive digests, Shepard's,
a key number system, CCH or PH type services, or an index to legal
periodicals. To be sure, cases are not as important in civil law juris-
dictions, and Brazil is better than most Latin American countries in
indexing and reporting cases. Nevertheless, the system falls far short
of what is available in the neighboring civil law jurisdiction of
Argentina.
It is not unusual to discover that the authorities charged with ad-
ministering a particular body of law are unaware of significant
changes in the statutory or case law. Inertia, ignorance, and inability
to keep abreast of rapid-fire legal change contribute to the gap be-
tween the law on the books and the law actually being applied.
107. Olimpiada Legislativa, Jornal do Brasil, May 27, 1980, at 10, col. 1.
108. The S(Imula is a collection of rules of law that have become firmly settled by deci-
sions of the Supreme Federal Tribunal. Its provisions are summarily cited to dispose of those
issues in future litigation. The S(Imula can be overruled or modified, but only by an absolute
majority of the full tribunal. Regimento Interno do Supremo Tribunal Federal, arts. 98, § 1 &
99 (1979). For an authoritative account of the origins and importance of the Smula, see Nunes
Leal, Passado e Futuro da S(mula do S.T.F., 145 Rav. Din. AD. 1 (1981).
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B. After Goulart, the Deluge
The acceleration of modernization in the past four decades has
strikingly transformed much of Brazil from a traditional, semifeudal,
agrarian society into an urban, industrialized nation. This develop-
ment has rendered much of the basic law hopelessly obsolete. More-
over, the modernization process has been accompanied by tremen-
dous inflation, itself an important cause of legal obsolescence.""9 A
number of projects have been started to reform outmoded codes, but
with few exceptions, most of these projects have produced only new
drafts rather than new codes.
In an effort to bring the legal system to grips with many of the
nation's most pressing economic and social problems, the post-1964
military regimes have unleashed a legislative deluge.1"0 Much of this
new socio-economic legislation has been incredibly complicated and
difficult to administer. This is partially because much has been
drafted by economists and engineers, and partly because much has
been enacted by executive decree, eliminating the opportunity for
legislative debate and hearings that might have eliminated some of
the ambiguities and complexity. Eventually, this phase of constant
experimentation and tinkering will draw to a close, and the new legal
framework will have a chance to be absorbed by the groups whose
conduct is being regulated. Until then, there is always the jeito.
C. The Malfunctioning of the Court System
The malfunctioning of the court system has also been responsible
for the prevalence of the jeito. The reputation of the Brazilian courts
for efficiency and integrity in discharging their official functions has
been badly tarnished in recent years."' The rapid growth of the pop-
109. See K. ROSENN, supra note 22; Lefcoe, Money Correction and Mortgage Lending in
Brazil: Observations for the United States, 21 STA. L. REv. 106 (1968); Rosenn, Adaptations
of the Brazilian Income Tax to Inflation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 58 (1968).
110. Between April 2, 1964, when the military ousted the Goulart regime, and the end of
December 1982, the executive promulgated 2,000 decree-laws and 35,194 decrees. During the
same time, the Congress approved only 2,766 laws. Because Brazilian legislation is numbered
sequentially, these figures were obtained by simply subtracting the numeration of each respec-
tive category of legislation on March 31, 1964, from the corresponding numeration on December
31, 1982.
111. More than 90% of practicing lawyers surveyed in Rio de Janeiro indicated that judi-
cial administration was in a state of serious crisis. Principal explanations for the crisis were
delays, excessive formalism, and corruption. N. CORREIA DE MELO SOBRINHO, 0 ADVOGADO E A
CRISE NA ADMINISTnurAO DA JUSTIVA (1980). A former dean of the Law School of the Catholic
University in Rio de Janeiro incisively analyzed the failings of the Brazilian judiciary in these
terms:
In view of the low level of remuneration of its staff, its administrative conservativism,
and its technical dismantlement, it must be considered as a Judiciary that is operation-
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ulation and the economy has overcrowded court dockets. In some
courts delays are so long that the often heard lament-"What enters,
never leaves!"-appears justified. Brazilian civil procedure offers
seemingly endless opportunities for delay; loopholes and possibilities
for filing additional appeals abound.
Those with good tort or contract claims have been reluctant to
enter the courts to enforce them. Brazil has been characterized as a
defendant's jurisdiction, because of the historic tendency of Brazilian
judges to award small amounts to those bringing suit."2 Until 1981,
when a law was adopted requiring automatic adjustment of all judg-
ments in accordance with price index changes, " inflation had se-
verely undermined the efficacy of judicial awards.
The court system has been subverted by corruption, particularly
on the part of the police and court clerks, who are notoriously un-
derpaid. " " All too often pleadings or records mysteriously disappear.
One judge of a state criminal court in Rio de Janeiro recently com-
plained that in his division alone 142 cases had simply disappeared
and another 72 had been archived without judicial decision or with
forged judicial signatures. If these were merely traffic cases, the situa-
tion would be deplorable, but what is so shocking is that all these
missing cases were homicides." 5 Rio's leading newspaper recently
carried the story of a state representative, who although convicted of
numerous crimes, avoided serving any sentence because the court
records in his case had mysteriously vanished." 6
Litigation is very expensive in Brazil. Court costs, which are
ally inefficient. In view of the elevated procedural costs, the excessive professional ritual-
ism, and the rigid structure of power, it must be considered as a Judiciary that is socially
elitist. Finally, in view of its precarious economic and financial automony, the formal
selection process for judges, and its subservient relations with the Executive, it must be
considered as a Judiciary that is politically dependent.
Fac&o Neto, Cultura Juridica e Democracia: A Favor da Democratizaqao do Judicidrio, in
DiRm'ro, CIDADANIA E PARTIC1PAQAO 3, 4 (B. Lamounier et al. eds. 1981).
112. P. GARLAND, A BUSINESSMAN'S INTRODUCTION To BRAzILIAN LAW AND PRACTICE 21
(1966).
113. Law No. 6.899 of Apr. 8, 1981. Monetary correction now covers all judgment debts,
including costs and awards for attorney's fees, until the date of effective payment. Id. at art. 1.
Monetary correction begins on the date of judgment except for suits to collect liquid and cer-
tain debts, where monetary correction runs from the date of maturity. Id. at art. 1, §§ 1 & 2.
114. In December 1983, court clerks in Rio de Janeiro were being paid roughly $45 to
$310 per month, depending upon experience. Jornal do Brasil, Dec. 15, 1983, 1st cad., at 8, cola.
2-3. A very sizeable percentage (76.6%) of lawyers interviewed in Rio pointed to the low sala-
ries paid to the court clerks as responsible for corruption in performance of their duties. N.
CORREIA DE MmLo SOBRINHO, supra note 111, at 47.
115. Jornal do Brasil, Nov. 28, 1983, 1st cad., at 12, col. 2.
116. Jornal do Brasil, Nov. 2, 1983, 1st cad., at 12, cols. 2-4. See also Jornal do Brasil,
Sept. 18, 1983, 1st cad., at 28, col. 5.
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generally fixed in accordance with the amount allegedly in contro-
versy, are high; indeed, for small claims they sometimes exceed the
amount in controversy. 117 Attorneys fees are also expensive. Although
the prevailing party is normally awarded attorneys fees, lawyers cus-
tomarily arrange for considerably higher fees than the relatively
modest percentages awarded by the courts, and contingency fees and
class actions, which are so common in the United States, are unavail-
able in Brazil.118 Scattered legal aid programs provide occasional as-
sistance for a tiny percentage of the poor," 9 but it is fair to state that
the great bulk of Brazil's population is effectively denied access to
justice by economic barriers. As part of the current debureaucratiza-
tion effort, a small claims court with a greatly simplified and inex-
pensive procedure, has recently begun in the state of Rio Grande do
Sul and will hopefully be replicated in the rest of the country.
The lengthy delays, coupled with the expense and the unlikeli-
hood of receiving anywhere close to a complete indemnification, have
made many Brazilians reluctant to enforce their rights in court. Be-
cause the judicial process has become dysfunctional, many are in-
clined to seek alternative methods of protecting themselves.
VI. COSTS OF THE JEITO
Several problems created by the corrupt components of the jeito
are obvious. Resources are frequently misallocated when the criterion
of the private gain of the allocator is employed. Procurement of con-
struction contracts become more costly, either through the total price
paid or the inferior quality of the performance received. Much social
injustice and unrest stems from permitting certain firms and individ-
uals to avoid compliance with the law through payment of bribes or
utilization of family connections.
The government's power to redistribute income, stimulate desira-
ble conduct, or discourage undesirable conduct through taxation or
regulatory legislation is sharply limited by the loopholes carved
through corrupt practices. As Gunnar Myrdal has observed in the
South Asian context, "Corruption introduces an element of irration-
117. Court costs were recently raised 300% in the state of Rio de Janeiro, producing pro-
tests from the Bar Association about pricing justice out of reach of most Brazilians. Jornal do
Brasil, July 14, 1983, 1st cad., at 12, colb. 3-4.
118. Brazilian attorneys frequently charge more if they win, but they seldom agree to
charge nothing if they lose. Joinder of litigants is common, but true class actions in the U.S.
sense are not permitted in Brazil. Moreover, standing rules prevent associations from litigating
on behalf of their members with the exception of the labor courts. FalAo Neto, supra note 111,
at 8-9.
119. Knight, Legal Services Projects for Latin America, in LEGAL AID AND WORLD POV-
ERTY 77, 82-87 (Committee on Legal Services to the Poor in the Developing Countries ed. 1974).
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ality in plan fulfillment by influencing the actual course of develop-
ment in a way that is contrary to the plan or, if such influence is
foreseen, by limiting the horizon of the plan.' 120 Government power
to promote development is also weakened to the extent that toler-
ance of corruption saps popular support and respect for the
government.
It is expensive and time consuming to have to resort to
despachantes every time licenses or permissions are needed. Many
are forced to forego economic opportunities because they cannot af-
ford this expense. The cycle can be vicious indeed. A person whose
papers are not in order has great difficulty securing employment, but
he may not be able to secure the necessary documents without the
aid of a despachante, whose services he cannot afford. The small en-
terpreneur may be thwarted from opening his own business because
he has insufficient capital to pay for the expenses of legalizing the
business. 12 1 The system heavily discriminates against the poor, who
are forced to wait patiently in the long lines in front of the windows
of governmental departments. Millions of potentially productive
manhours are lost waiting in these lines.
The corrupt aspects of the jeito retard administrative efficiency.
People are reluctant to assume personal responsibility for decision
making, preferring to pass documents up for higher consideration.
Civil servants do nothing without written authorization, and fear of
an investigation leads to much collegiate decision-making to divide or
obscure responsibility. The practices of exacting "speed money" and
"delay money" also impede administrative efficiency. While speed
money may accelerate the administrative process in individual cases,
studies in other countries have concluded that the practice actually
aggravates delays in the administrative apparatus as a whole.12 2 A
fortiori, payment of "delay money," a common practice for defen-
dants unanxious to see their cases speedily determined or a competi-
tor licensed, bogs down the system.
The jeito is essentially an ad hoc institution, and its uncertainty
and unpredictability discourages potential investors. Lack of a pre-
dictable legal structure makes business planning difficult. Transac-
120. 2 G. MYRDAL, ASIAN DM 952 (1968).
121. Currently, a small business may need as many as 38 different bureaucratic permis-
sions in order to operate legally. These are listed in Timotheo, Pequenos empresdrios lutam
para vencer a burocracia, Jornal do Brasil, July 18, 1983, 1st cad., at 12, cols. 3-4. As a result of
the debureaucratization campaign, however, obtaining permission from the Commercial Regis-
try has become much simpler and rapid. Jornal do Brasil, Aug. 28, 1983, 1st cad., at 29, cols. 1-
3.
122. This was the finding of the Indian Committee on Prevention of Corruption
(Santhanam Committee 1964), noted in 1 G. MYRDAL, AsIAN DRAMA 953 (1968).
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tions cloaked in the dubious legality of the jeito may wear well today
but come apart at the seams tomorrow.
There is a significant moral cost as well. Frequent resort to the
jeito contributes to the general disrespect for the rule of law and or-
derly processes-a very serious problem in present day Brazil. The
fact that competitors resort to the jeito with impunity forces the bus-
inessman who may wish to respect the law to circumvent it in order
to compete. The corrupt side of the jeito produces widespread tax
evasion in Brazil, whose underground economy is estimated at thirty-
five percent of Gross Domestic Product. This is reputedly the second
largest underground economy in the world. 123 Outgrowths of both the
corrupt and public service sides of the jeito are the dramatic upsurge
in lynchings and the blatant activities of death squads that systemat-
ically liquidate common criminals.124 Police routinely beat confes-
sions from suspects classified as common criminals, a long-standing
practice that has traditionally escaped judicial control.125 Once one
condones the principle that officials and private citizens may reinter-
pret or ignore laws they deem overly restrictive or unwise, resort to
that principle is not easily cabined. Discriminatory law enforcement
and the breakdown of legitimacy may well be the result.
Still another significant cost resulting from widespread resort to
the jeito is the loss of governmental credibility. The Brazilian gov-
ernment also resorts to the jeito to achieve particular short-term
objectives. For example, the cost-of-living index was notoriously
manipulated in 1973 to understate the inflation rate by half.126 More
recently, the government misrepresented the size of its fiscal deficit
in an effort to secure release of badly needed foreign currency loans
from the International Monetary Fund. This bald-faced attempt at
"cooking the books" backfired and resulted in a long delay in the
release of loan funds to Brazil.
127
Finally, by acting as a safety valve, the jeito tends to prevent the
building up of sufficient pressure for sorely needed legal and adminis-
trative reform. Legal structures that have long since broken down
continue to function with the patchwork of the jeito. All too fre-
quently the patch works poorly, producing serious misallocations of
123. The Rise of the "Black" Economy, LAT. Am. REG. REP. BRAZi., Sept. 16, 1983, at 6-7.
124. See H. BicuDo, M u DoimENrro S68RH 0 ESQUAD aO DA MORTE (7th ed. 1978).
125. Pinheiro, Violncia e Cultura, in DmaErro, CIDADANIA E PARncnip4o 30 (B.
Lamnounier et al. eds. 1981). See also H. BicuDo, Comentdrios, supra note 124, at 59.
126. K. RoSENN, supra note 22, at 406 n.17; Jornal do Brasil, June 28, 1983, 1st cad., at
17, col. 1.
127. See Thumbs-down from IMF Fuels Fears of Brazilian Moratorium, LAT. Am.
WEEKLY RaP., May 27, 1983, at 1; IMF Investigates Failure to Meet Performances Targets,
LAT. Am. WEEKLY REP., May 6, 1983, at 4-5.
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resources. The case of regulation of the electric power industry illus-
trates this misallocation. Legislation adopted in 1934 limited the re-
turn on a power company's investment to ten percent of its historic
or original cost, less depreciation.12 8 Despite a statute that required
the government to inventory the assets of the electric companies, the
government either could not or would not determine these rate ba-
ses.129 Although it may have been appropriate for a stable economy,
this regulatory scheme was most inappropriate for Brazil, where in-
flation has been chronically severe. Because the chief power compa-
nies were foreign-owned, widespread nationalistic opposition blocked
a change of the law in order to benefit the power companies. 130
Brazil's impressively rapid economic growth in the post World
War II decades required large increases in electric power, and the
power companies were understandably reluctant to increase their in-
vestments without being assured an adequate return. Characteristi-
cally, the impasse was resolved by retaining the basic regulatory stat-
ute but bending it to expediency via special temporary decrees and
the jeito. Instead of modifying the basic rate structure, the govern-
ment permitted the power companies to increase their total revenues
through "additionals" or surcharges, preferential exchange subsidies,
generous financing, toleration of dubious accounting procedures, and
charges to consumers to finance connections to the net. The power
companies were also permitted to increase their revenues by overex-
tending their distribution systems. In addition, the government itself
assumed major responsibility for generating electric power, leaving
the private companies with the distributing phase of the
operations.131
In this case the jeito enabled Brazil to muddle through some
twenty years of serious inflation without modifying a totally obsolete
regulatory structure. On the other hand, the accommodation of the
jeito was far from ideal. The uncertainty and instability of the extra-
legal negotiations and special arrangements by which the power com-
panies were regulated discouraged much-needed investment and long
range planning for the power industry. Existing equipment was seri-
ously overloaded and allowed to run down, producing chronic black-
128. The Water Code, Decree No. 24.643 of July 10, 1934, art. 180. Cf. Decree-Law No.
3.128 of Mar. 19, 1941, arts. 2 & 9.
129. Parecer do Ministro Orosimbo Nonato, in A Verdade s6bre as Concessbes de Ele-
tricidade no Brasil 15, 16 (1962).
130. J. TENDLER, ELECTRmC POWER IN BP zn.: ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
55-59 (1968). There was also widespread political opposition to legislative recognition of infla-
tion adjustments on the theory that this would be tantamount to a public concession of the
government's inability to control inflation. Id. at 57.
131. Id. at 44-79.
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outs. This, in turn, impeded industrial production and commerce, as
did the substantial delays in connecting new service applicants. In
addition, factories and businesses had to incur the additional ex-
penses of installing their own generating equipment for the frequent
emergencies and to bear the costs of interrupted service.
VII. BENEFITS OF THE JEITO
When the formal legal structure contains serious impediments to
development, the jeito may play a positive role in the development
process by permitting avoidance of legal and administrative hangups
at relatively little cost. When stymied by restrictive legislation, the
innovator is able to resort to the jeito to introduce new approaches
without governmental interference, just as the sufficiently capitalized
enterpreneur is able to utilize the jeito quickly to legalize a new
venture.
When the government adopts short-sighted policies, the jeito can
be an important factor in minimizing the damage. For example, both
Chile and Brazil tried to fight inflation by freezing food prices. Chil-
ean bureaucrats struggled valiantly to enforce these price controls,
thereby stagnating the food supply and increasing inflationary pres-
sures. On the other hand, Brazilian bureaucrats characteristically
permitted the jeito to operate. Consequently, agricultural prices were
allowed to rise enough to stimulate an increase in the production of
foodstuffs, helping relieve some of the inflationary pressure.
132
In practice, the net effect of the jeito is frequently to push the
government into assuming a more laissez-faire position than it is
ideologically disposed to assume. Like many developing nations, Bra-
zil has considerable regulatory legislation designed to curb economic
abuses, i.e., foreign investment regulations, transfer of technology re-
strictions, price controls, and usury laws. If rigorously enforced, such
legislation might well nip economic growth in the bud. Permitting
circumvention, as the Brazilians have done, enables the government
to cater to popular pressures for restraining certain kinds of useful
economic activities without actually preventing such activities.
In a world in which laws and regulations are constantly changing,
the jeito ironically serves as an important source of stability and pre-
dictability. Industrial and commercial activity is much less precarious
when businessmen and industrialists have a sense that no matter
what changes tomorrow may bring in the law, the jeito, be it corrupt
or public serving, will insure business'as usual. Indeed, it can even be
132. See Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 Am. BEHAv.
Sci., No. 3, pp. 11-12 (Nov. 1964).
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argued that the corrupt-type jeito will in the long run promote eco-
nomic efficiency, for the most efficient firms will be able to offer the
largest bribes and eliminate their more inefficient competitors. 8 To
the extent that the jeito functions equally well on kinship or friend-
ship ties, however, inefficient firms will still be able to compete.
One can also argue that the jeito, particularly in its "speed
money" form, operates as a direct tax on those best able to pay, and
is thus one of the few progressive features in Brazil's regressive tax
system. Moreover, this direct tax has little leakage since the sums
collected go directly to poorly paid public servants as salary supple-
ments. This analysis, however, ignores the very real economic burden
placed on the poor who need the governmental services but cannot
pay the tax. The poor ultimately pay an even heavier tax in the form
of man-hours lost from work and the time spent without needed gov-
ernmental documents and licenses.
The chief benefit of an institution like the jeito is that it permits
a society to buy time to work out serious institutional tensions with-
out violently rupturing the social fabric. Major overhauls in a na-
tion's legal and administrative structure produce severe strains and
stresses. Frequently, there is little political consensus about whether
and how basic institutions should be modernized. The jeito may be
considered a way of temporizing to avert, or at least postpone, civil
strife. By preserving the facade of legitimacy in the face of rapid so-
cial and economic change, the jeito has been invaluable in enabling
the Brazilian system to operate without violent conflict.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to separate the benefits of the jeito from the costs of
having an obsolete or unsuitable legal system, for the two plainly
overlap. If the choice were between continuing to operate with an
obsolete or unsuitable legal structure and operating with the jeito, in
the great majority of cases the latter will produce a net benefit, espe-
cially where the jeito is employed in a public service sense. At least
the jeito enables a society to continue to function despite the inap-
propriateness of its formal legal system. Closer examination, however,
may lead to the conclusion that there is no real choice. Brazil could
not have tolerated the closing down of its power companies because
of inadequate returns. If the jeito had not been employed, the coun-
try would have had to modify its regulatory legislation or nationalize
the foreign power companies. Either of these avenues entailed serious
political and economic costs, which must be subtracted from the cost
133. Id. at 11.
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of resorting to the jeito.
Although the jeito results in a number of important benefits, they
are primarily short-run benefits. In the long-run the jeito, and the
style of operations which it permits to continue, constitute serious
obstacles to development. Development requires a high degree of so-
cial integration and community cooperation, as well as departure
from traditional, personalistic, authoritarian patterns of behavior. It
also requires greater productivity and fairer redistribution of income.
The formal legal system can be one of the modern state's most effec-
tive instruments for promotion of social interdependence and more
equitable distribution of wealth. The existence of an institution such
as the jeito, however, enables a society to continue individualistic,
traditional patterns of behavior despite the state's attempt to substi-
tute more progressive, achievement-oriented patterns of behavior via
the formal legal structure.
Ultimately, development should imply far more than increases in
per capita income, investment, or productivity. Development should
also imply the existence of an institutional structure which will per-
mit meaningful equality before the law. Conditions precedent to such
equality are a formal legal structure reasonably attuned to the times
and culture, a high degree of obedience to the rule of law, and imper-
sonal, efficient administration of the laws. A modern developed soci-
ety should have little room for the operation of an institution like the
jeito. A society like Brazil, however, which has such a plethora of
laws, decrees, and regulations that retard development, appears to be
have room aplenty.
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